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Abstract
A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling
schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue.
One of the research endeavors of this line of work is understanding the algorithmic and compu-
tational complexity of designing efficient signaling schemes. In reality, however, information is
typically not held by a central authority, but is distributed among multiple sources (third-party
“mediators”), a fact that dramatically changes the strategic and combinatorial nature of the
signaling problem, making it a game between information providers, as opposed to a traditional
mechanism design problem.
In this paper we introduce distributed signaling games, while using display advertising as a
canonical example for introducing this foundational framework. A distributed signaling game
may be a pure coordination game (i.e., a distributed optimization task), or a non-cooperative
game. In the context of pure coordination games, we show a wide gap between the computational
complexity of the centralized and distributed signaling problems, proving that distributed coor-
dination on revenue-optimal signaling is a much harder problem than its “centralized” counter-
part. On the other hand, we show that if the information structure of each mediator is assumed
to be “local”, then there is an efficient algorithm that finds a near-optimal (5-approximation)
distributed signaling scheme.
In the context of non-cooperative games, the outcome generated by the mediators’ signals
may have different value to each. The reason for that is typically the desire of the auctioneer to
align the incentives of the mediators with his own by a compensation relative to the marginal
benefit from their signals. We design a mechanism for this problem via a novel application of
Shapley’s value, and show that it possesses some interesting properties; in particular, it always
admits a pure Nash equilibrium, and it never decreases the revenue of the auctioneer.
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1 Introduction
The topic of signaling has recently received much attention in the computer science literature on
mechanism design [CCDT14, DIR14, Dug14, EFG+14]. A recurring theme of this literature is that
proper design of a signaling scheme is crucial for obtaining efficient outcomes, such as social welfare
maximization or revenue maximization. In reality, however, sources of information are typically not
held by a central authority, but are rather distributed among third party mediators/information
providers, a fact which dramatically changes the setup to be studied, making it a game between
information providers rather than a more classic mechanism design problem. Such a game is in
the spirit of work on the theory of teams in economics [MR72], whose computational complexity
remained largely unexplored. The goal of this paper is to initiate an algorithmic study of such
games, which we term distributed signaling games, via what we view as a canonical example:
Bayesian auctions; and more specifically, display advertising in the presence of third party external
mediators (information provides), capturing the (multi-billion) ad exchanges industry.
Consider a web-site owner that auctions each user’s visit to its site, a.k.a. impression. The
impression types are assumed to arrive from a commonly known distribution. The bidders are
advertisers who know that distribution, but only the web site owner knows the impression type
instantiation, consisting of identifiers such as age, origin, gender and salary of the web-site visitor.
As is the practice in existing ad exchanges, we assume the auction is a second price auction. The
web-site owner decides on the information (i.e., signal) about the instantiation to be provided to
the bidders, which then bid their expected valuations for the impression given the information
provided. The selection of the proper signaling by the web-site is a central mechanism design
problem. Assume, for example, an impression associated with two attributes: whether the user is
male or female on one side, and whether he is located in the US or out of the US on the other
side. This gives 4 types of possible users. Assume for simplicity that the probability of arrival of
each user type is 1/4, and that there are four advertisers each one of them has value of $100 for
a distinguished user type and $0 for the other types, where these values are common-knowledge.
One can verify that an auctioneer who reveals no information receives an expected payoff of $25,
an auctioneer who reveals all information gets no payoff, while partitioning the impression types
into two pairs, revealing only the pair of the impression which was materialized (rather than the
exact instantiation) will yield a payoff of $50, which is much higher revenue.
While the above example illustrates the importance of signaling, and its natural fit to mechanism
design, its major drawback is in the unrealistic manner in which information is manipulated: while
some information about the auctioned item is typically published by the ad network [YWZ13]
(such information is modeled here as a public prior), and despite the advertisers’ effort to perform
“behavioral targeting” by clever data analysis (e.g., utilizing the browsing history of a specific user
to infer her interests), the quantity of available contextual information and market expertise is often
way beyond the capabilities of both advertisers and auctioneers. This reality gave rise to “third-
party” companies which develop technologies for collecting data and online statistics used to infer
the contexts of auctioned impressions (see, e.g., [MM12] and references therein). Consequently, a
new distributed ecosystem has emerged, in which many third-party companies operate within the
market aiming at maximizing their own utility (royalties or other compensations), while significantly
increasing the effectiveness of display advertising, as suggested by the following article recently
published by Facebook:
“Many businesses today work with third parties such as Acxiom, Datalogix, and Epsilon
to help manage and understand their marketing efforts. For example, an auto dealer
may want to customize an offer to people who are likely to be in the market for a new
car. The dealer also might want to send offers, like discounts for service, to customers
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that have purchased a car from them. To do this, the auto dealer works with a third-
party company to identify and reach those customers with the right offer”.
(www.facebook.com, “Advertising and our Third-Party Partners”, April 10, 2013.)
Hence, in reality sources of information are distributed. Typically, the information is distributed
among several mediators or information providers/brokers, and is not held (or mostly not held) by
a central authority/web-site owner. In the display advertising example one information source may
know the gender and one may know the location of the web-site visitor, while the web-site itself
often lacks the capability to track such information. The information sources need to decide on
the communicated information. In this case the information sources become players in a game. To
make the situation clearer, assume (as above) that the value of each impression type for each bidder
is public-knowledge (as is typically the case in repeated interactions through ad exchanges which
share their logs with the participants), and the only unknown entity is the instantiation of the
impression type; given the information learned from the information sources each bidder will bid
his true expected valuation; hence, the results of this game are determined solely by the information
providers. Notice that if, in the aforementioned example, the information provider who knows the
gender reveals it while the other reveals nothing, then the auctioneer recieves a revenue of $50 as in
the centralized case, while the cases in which both information providers reveal their information
or none of them do so result in lower revenues. This shows the subtlety of the situation.
The above suggests that a major issue to tackle is the study of distributed signaling games,
going beyond the realm of classical mechanism design. We use a model of the above display
advertising setting, due to its centrality, as a tool to introduce this novel foundational topic. The
distributed signaling games may be pure coordination games (a.k.a. distributed optimization), or
non-cooperative games. In the context of pure coordination games each information source has
the same utility from the output created by their joint signal. Namely, in the above example if
the web-site owner pays each information source proportionally to the revenue obtained by the
web-site owner then the aims of the information sources are identical. The main aim of the third
parties/mediators is to choose their signals based on their privately observed information in a
distributed manner in order to optimize their own payoffs. Notice that in a typical embodiment,
which we adapt, due to both technical and legal considerations, the auctioneer does not synthesize
reported signals into new ones nor the information providers are allowed to explicitly communicate
among them about the signals, but can only broadcast information they individually gathered. The
study of the computational complexity of this highly fundamental problem is the major technical
challenge tackled in this paper. Interestingly, we show a wide gap between the computational
complexity of the centralized and of the distributed signaling setups, proving that coordinating on
optimal signaling is a much harder problem than the one discussed in the context of centralized
mechanism design. On the other hand we also show a natural restriction on the way information
is distributed among information providers, which allows for an efficient constant approximation
scheme.
In the context of non-cooperative games the outcome generated by the information sources’
reports may result in a different value for each of them. The reason for that is typically the desire
of the auctioneer to align the incentives of the mediators with his own by a compensation relative to
the marginal benefit from their signals. In the above example one may compare the revenue obtained
without the additional information sources, to what is obtained through their help, and compensate
relatively to the Shapley values of their contributions, which is a standard (and rigorously justified)
tool to fully divide a gain yielded by the cooperation of several parties. Here we apply such division
to distributed signaling games, and show that it possesses some interesting properties: in particular
the corresponding game has a pure strategy equilibrium, a property of the Shapley value which
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is shown for the first time for signaling settings (and is vastly different from previous studies of
Shapley mechanisms in non-cooperative settings such as cost-sharing games [RS06]).
1.1 Model
Our model is a generalization of the one defined in [GNS07]. There is a ground set I = [n] of
potential items (contexts) to be sold and a set B = [k] of bidders. The value of item j for bidder
i is given as vij . Following the above discussion (and the previous line of work, e.g., [EDKW07,
GNS07]), we assume the valuation matrix V = {vi,j} is publicly known. An auctioneer is selling
a single random item jR, distributed according to some publicly known prior distribution µ over
I, using a second price auction (a more detailed description of the auction follows). There is an
additional set M = [m] of “third-party” mediators. Following standard practice in game theoretic
information models [Aum76, FHMV95, EFG+14], we assume each mediator t ∈ M is equipped
with a partition (signal-set) Pt ∈ Ω(I)
1. Intuitively, Pt captures the extra information t has about
the item which is about to be sold—he knows the set S ∈ Pt to which the item jR belongs, but
has no further knowledge about which item of S it is (except for the a priori distribution µ)—in
other words, the distribution t has in mind is µ|S . For example, if the signal-set partition Pt
partitions the items of I into pairs, then mediator t knows to which pair {j1, j2} ∈ Pt the item jR
belongs, but he has no information whether it is j1 or j2, and therefore, from her point of view,
Pr[jR = j1] = µ(j1)/µ({j1, j2}).
Mediators can signal some (or all) of the information they own to the network. Formally, this
is represented by allowing each mediator t to report any super-partition P ′t, which is obtained by
merging partitions in her signal-set partition Pt (in other words Pt must be a refinement of P
′
t).
In other words, a mediator may report any partition P ′t for which there exists a set Q
′
t ∈ Ω(Pt)
such that P ′t = {∪S∈AS | A ∈ Q
′
t}. In particular, a mediator can always report {I}, in which
case we say that he remains silent since he does not contribute any information. The signals
P ′1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m reported by the mediators are broadcasted
2 to the bidders, inducing a combined
partition P , ×mt=1P
′
t = {∩i∈MAi | Ai ∈ P
′
i}, which we call the joint partition (or joint signal). P
splits the auction into separate “restricted” auctions. For each bundle S ∈ P, the item jR belongs
to S with probability µ(S) =
∑
j∈S µ(j), in which case S is signaled to the bidders and a second-
price auction is performed over µ|S . Notice that if the signaled bundle is S ⊆ I, then the (expected)
value of bidder i for jR ∼ µ|S is vi,S =
1
µ(S)
∑
j∈S(µ(j) · vij), and the truthfulness of the second
price auction implies that this will also be bidder i’s bid for the restricted auction. The winner of
the auction is the bidder with the maximum bid maxi∈B vi,S, and he is charged the second highest
valuation for that bundle max
(2)
i∈B vi,S . Therefore, the auctioneer’s revenue with respect to P is the
expectation (over S ∈R P) of the price paid by the winning bidder:
R(P) =
∑
S∈P
µ(S) ·max
(2)
i∈B(vi,S) .
The joint partition P signaled by the mediators can dramatically affect the revenue of the
1For a set S, Ω(S) , {A ⊆ 2S |
⋃
A∈AA = S,∀A,B∈AA ∩B = ∅} is the collection of all partitions of S.
2By saying that a mediator reports P ′t, we mean that he reports the bundle S ∈ P
′
t for which jR ∈ S. The reader
may wonder why our model is a broadcast model, and does not allow the mediators to report their information
to the auctioneer through private channels, in which case the ad network will be able to manipulate and publish
whichever information that best serves its interest. The primary reason for the broadcast assumption is that the
online advertising market is highly dynamic and mediators often “come and go”, so implementing such “private
contracts” is infeasible. The second reason is that real-time bidding environments cannot afford the latency incurred
by such a two-phase procedure in which the auctioneer first collects the information, and then selectively publishes
it. The auction process is usually treated as a “black box”, and modifying it harms the modularity of the system.
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auctioneer. Consider, for example, the case where V is the 4× 4 identity matrix, µ is the uniform
distribution, and M consists of two mediators associated with the partitions P1 = {{1, 2} , {3, 4}}
and P2 = {{1, 3} , {2, 4}}. If both mediators remain silent, the revenue is R({I}) = 1/4 (as
this is the average value of all 4 bidders for a random item). However, observe that P1 × P2 =
{{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}, and the second highest value in every column of V is 0, thus, if both report
their partitions, the revenue drops to R(P1 × P2) = 0. Finally, if mediator 1 reports P1, while
meditor 2 keeps silent, the revenue increases from 1/4 to R(P1) = 1/2, as the value of each pair
of items is 1/2 for two different bidders (thus, the second highest price for each pair is 1/2). This
example can be easily generalized to show that in general the intervention of mediators can increase
the revenue by a factor of n/2 !
Indeed, the purpose of this paper is to understand how mediators’ (distributed) signals affect
the revenue of the auctioneer. We explore the following two aspects of this question:
1. (Computational) Suppose the auctioneer has control over the signals reported by the media-
tors. We study the computational complexity of the following problem. Given a k×n matrix
V of valuations and mediators’ partitions P1,P2, . . . ,Pm, what is the revenue maximizing
joint partition P = P ′1 × . . . × P
′
m? We call this problem the Distributed Signaling Problem,
and denote it by DSP(n, k,m).
We note that the problem studied in [GNS07] is a special case of DSP, in which there is
a single mediator (m = 1) with perfect knowledge about the item sold and can report any
desirable signal (partition).3
2. (Strategic) What if the auctioneer cannot control the signals reported by the mediators (as
the reality of the problem usually entails)? Can the auctioneer introduce compensations that
will incentivize mediators to report signals leading to increased revenue in the auction, when
each mediator is acting selfishly?
This is a mechanism design problem: Here the auctioneer’s goal is to design a payment rule
(i.e., a mechanism) for allocating (part of) his profit from the auction among the mediators,
based on their reported signals and the auction’s outcome, so that global efficiency (i.e.,
maximum revenue) emerges from their signals.
Section 1.2 summarizes our findings regarding the two above problems.
1.2 Our Results
Ghosh et al. [GNS07] showed that computing the revenue-maximizing signal in their “perfect-
knowledge” setup is NP -hard, but present an efficient algorithm for computing a 2-approximation
of the optimal signal (partition). We show that when information is distributed, the problem
becomes much harder. More specifically, we present a gap-preserving reduction from the Maximum
Independent Set problem to DSP.
Theorem 1.1 (Hardness of approximating DSP). If there exists an O(m1/2−ε) approximation
(for some constant ε > 0) for instances of DSP(2m,m + 1,m), then there exists a O(N1−2ε)
approximation for Maximum Independent Set (MISN), where N is the number of nodes in the
underlying graph of the MIS instance.
Since the Maximum Independent Set problem is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of
n1−ρ for any fixed ρ > 0 [H99], Theorem 1.1 indicates that approximating the revenue-maximizing
3In other words, P1 is the partition of I into singletons.
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signal, even within a multiplicative factor of O((min{n, k,m})1/2−ε), is NP-hard. In other words,
one cannot expect a reasonable approximation ratio for DSP(n, k,m) when the three parameters
of the problem are all “large”. The next theorem shows that a “small” value for either one of the
parameters n or k indeed implies a better approximation ratio.
Theorem 1.2 (Approximation algorithm for small n or k). There is an efficient max{1,min{n, k−
1}}-approximation algorithm for DSP.
We leave open the problem of determining whether one can get an improved approximation
ratio when the parameter m is “small”. For m = 1, the result of [GNS07] implies immediately a 2-
approximation algorithm. However, even for the case of m = 2 we are unable to find an algorithm
having a non-trivial approximation ratio. We mitigate the above results by proving that for a
natural (and realistic) class of mediators called local experts (defined in Section 3), there exists an
efficient 5-approximation algorithm for DSP.
Theorem 1.3 (A 5-approximation algorithm for Local Expert mediators). If mediators are local
experts, there exists an efficient 5-approximation algorithm for DSP.
In the strategic setup, we design a fair (symmetric) payment rule S : (P ′1,P
′
2, ...,P
′
m)→ R
m
+ for
incentivizing mediators to report useful information they own, and refrain from reporting informa-
tion with negative impact on the revenue. This mechanism is inspired by the Shapley Value—it
distributes part of the auctioneer’s surplus among the mediators according to their expected relative
marginal contribution to the revenue, when ordered randomly.4 We first show that this mechanism
always admits a pure Nash equilibrium, a property we discovered to hold for arbitrary games where
the value of the game is distributed among players according to Shapley’s value function.
Theorem 1.4. Let Gm be a non-cooperative m-player game in which the payoff of each player is
set according to S. Then Gm admits a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, best response dynamics
are guaranteed to converge to such an equilibrium.
We then turn to analyze the revenue guarantees of our mechanism S. Our first theorem shows
that using the mechanism S never decreases the revenue of the auctioneer compared to the initial
state (i.e., when all mediators are silent).
Theorem 1.5. For every Nash equilibrium (P ′1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m) of S, R(×t∈MP
′
t) ≥ R({I}).
The next two theorems provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy and price of stability of S.5
Unlike in the computational setup, restricting the mediators to be local experts does enable us to
get improved results here.
Theorem 1.6. The price of anarchy of S under any instance DSP(n, k,m) is no more than
max{1,min{k − 1, n}}.
Theorem 1.7. For every n ≥ 1, there is a DSP(3n + 1, n + 2, 2) instance for which the price of
stability of S is at least n. Moreover, all the mediators in this instance are local experts.
4Shapley’s value was originally introduced in the context of cooperative games, where there is a well defined
notion of a coalition’s value. In order to apply this notation to a non-cooperative game, we assume the game has
some underlying global function (v(·)) assigning a value to every strategy profile of the players, and the Shapley value
of each player is defined with respect to v(·). In this setting, a “central planner” (the auctioneer in our case) is the
one making the utility transfer to the “coalised” players. For the formal axiomatic definition of a value function and
Shapley’s value function, see [Sha53].
5The price of anarchy (stability) is the ratio between the revenue of the optimum and the worst (best) Nash
equilibrium.
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Interestingly, an adaptation of Shapley’s uniqueness theorem [Sha53] to our non-cooperative
setting asserts that the price of anarchy of our mechanism is inevitable if one insists on a few
natural requirements—essentially anonymity and efficiency6 of the payment rule—and assuming
the auctioneer alone can introduce payments. We discuss this further in Section 4.3.
1.3 Additional Related Work
The formal study of internet auctions with contexts was introduced by [EDKW07] where the
authors studied the impact of contexts in the related Sponsored Search model, and showed that
bundling contexts may have a significant impact on the revenue of the auctioneer. The subsequent
work of Ghosh et. al. [GNS07] considered the computational algorithmic problem of computing
the revenue maximizing partition of items into bundles, under a second price auction in the full
information setting. Recently, Emek et al. [EFG+14] studied signaling (which generalizes bundling)
in the context of display advertising. They explore the computational complexity of computing
a signaling scheme that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue in a Bayesian setting. Unlike our
distributed setup, both models of [GNS07] and [EFG+14] are centralized, in the sense that the
auctioneer has full control over the bundling process (which in our terms corresponds to having a
single mediator with a perfect knowledge about the item sold).
A different model with knowledgeable third parties was recently considered by Cavallo et
al. [CMV15]. However, the focus of this model is completely different then ours. More specifi-
cally, third parties in this model use their information to estimate the clicks-per-impression ratio,
and then use this estimate to bridge between advertisers who would like to pay-by-click and ad
networks which use a pay-by-impression payment scheme.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper we use capital letters for sets and calligraphic letters for set families. For
example, the partition Pt representing the knowledge of mediator t is a set of sets, and therefore,
should indeed be calligraphic according to this notation. A mechanism M is a tuple of payment
functions (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πm) determining the compensation of every mediator given a strategy profile
(i.e., Πt : Ω(P1)×Ω(P2)× . . .×Ω(Pm) −→ R
+). Every mechanism M induces the following game
between mediators.
Definition 2.1 (DSP game). Given a mechanism M = (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πm) and a DSP(n, k,m)
instance, the DSPM(n, k,m) game is defined as follows. Every mediator t ∈M is a player whose
strategy space consists of all partitions P ′t for which Pt is a refinement. Given a strategy profile
P ′1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m, the payoff of mediator t is Πt(P
′
1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m).
Given a DSP instance and a set S ⊆ I, we use the shorthand v(S) := max
(2)
i∈B(vi,S) to denote
the second highest bid in the restricted auction µ|S. Using this notation, the expected revenue of
the auctioneer under the (joint) partition P of the mediators can be written as
R(P) =
∑
S∈P
µ(S) · v(S) .
For a DSPM game, let E(M) denote the set of Nash equilibria of this game and let P
∗ be
a maximum revenue strategy profile. The Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability of DSPM are
6I.e., the sum of payments is equal to the total surplus of the auctioneer.
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defined as:
PoA := max
P∈E(M)
R(P∗)
R(P)
, and PoS := min
P∈E(M)
R(P∗)
R(P)
,
respectively. Notice that our definition of the price of anarchy and price of stability differs from
the standard one by using revenue instead of social welfare.
3 The Computational Problem
This section explores DSP from a pure combinatorial optimization viewpoint. In other words, we
assume the auctioneer can control the signals produced by each mediator. The objective of the
auctioneer is then to choose a distributed strategy profile P ′1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m whose combination ×tP
′
t
yields maximum revenue in the resulting auction. We begin with negative results (proving Theorem
1.1 in Subsection 3.1), and then proceed with a few approximation algorithms for the problem
(Subsection 3.2), including a 5-approximation algorithm for the case of local expert mediators
(Theorem 1.3).
3.1 Hardness of approximating DSP
It is not hard to show that solving DSP exactly, i.e., finding the maximum revenue strategy
profile, is NP-hard. In fact, this statement directly follows from the NP-hardness result of [GNS07]
by observing that the special case of a single mediator with perfect knowledge (P1 = {{j} | j ∈ I})
is equivalent to the centralized signaling model of [GNS07].
Proposition 3.1. Solving DSP exactly is NP-Hard.
The main result of this section is that approximating the revenue-maximizing signals, even
within a multiplicative factor of O((min{n, k,m})1/2−ε), remains NP-hard. This result is achieved
by a gap preserving reduction from Maximum Independent Set to DSP.
Theorem 3.2. For every integer ℓ ≥ 1, an α ≥ 1 approximation for DSP(2ℓN, ℓN + 1, ℓN)
induces a α(1 + ℓ−1(N + 1)) approximation for the Maximum Independent Set problem (where N
is the number of nodes in the graph).
Observe that Theorem 1.1 follows easy from Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 1.1. If there exists an O(m1/2−ε) approximation (for some constant ε > 0) for instances
of DSP(2m,m+1,m), then there exists a O(N1−2ε) approximation for Maximum Independent Set
(MISN), where N is the number of nodes in the underlying graph of the MIS instance.
Proof. Let ℓ = N + 1. By Theorem 3.2, there exists an approximation algorithm for Maximum
Independent Set whose approximation ratio is 2α, where α is the approximation ratio that can be
achieved for instances of DSP(2ℓN, ℓN + 1, ℓN). On the other hand, by our assumption:
α = O((ℓN)1/2−ε) = O(N2(1/2−ε)) = O(N1−2ε) ,
which completes the proof.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 3.2. The high-level idea of the reduction is as
follows. Given a graph G = (V,E), we map it to a DSP instance by associating ℓ pairs of (equi-
probbable) items {(jv,k , j
′
v,k)}
ℓ
k=1 with each node of the graph v ∈ V , where the items j
′
v,k are
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auxiliary items called the “helper items” of node v. Additionally, for each node we have ℓ single-
minded bidders, each of which is interested (exclusively) in a specific item jv,k. An additional bidder
(ih) is interested in all helper-items of all nodes. Finally, each node v ∈ V has a corresponding
set of ℓ mediators {mv,k}
ℓ
k=1 (one for each items pair). Each mediator mv,k has a single bit of
information, corresponding to whether or not the auctioned item belongs to the union set of the
k-th pair (jv,k, j
′
v,k) together with all helper elements of the neighbor nodes of v.
As the helper elements are valuable only to a single bidder ih, a part in a partition can have
a non-zero contribution to the revenue only if it contains at least two non-helper elements or at
least one helper element and at least one non-helper element. However, our construction ensures
that, whenever a strategy profile P involves at least two “active” mediators of neighboring nodes
(u, v) ∈ E, the resulting joint partition isolates the non-helper elements of u from helper elements
(except for maybe one part that might contain elements of both types). Thus, in a high revenue
strategy profile the set of nodes associated with many “speaking” (active) mediators must be close
to an independent set.
We now proceed with the formal proof. Given a graph G = (V,E) of N nodes, consider an
instance of DSP consisting of the following:
• A set {jv,k, j
′
v,k | v ∈ V, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ} of 2ℓN items having equal probabilities to appear.
For every node v and integer 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, the element j′v,k is referred to as the “helper”
item of jv,k. For notational convenience, we define the following sets for every node v ∈ V :
Jv = {jv,k | 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ} and Hv = {j
′
v,k | 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}.
• A set {iv,k, | v ∈ V, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ} ∪ {ih} of ℓN + 1 bidders. For every node v and integer
1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, the bidder iv,k has a value of 2ℓN for the item jv,k and a value of 0 for all other
item. The remaining bidder ih has a value of 2ℓN for each helper item (i.e., each item from
the set {j′v,k | v ∈ V, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}) and a value of 0 for the non-helper item.
• There are ℓN mediators {mv,k, | v ∈ V, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}. For every node v and integer 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ
the partition of mediator mv,k is defined as follows:
Pv,k =

{jv,k, j′v,k} ∪ ⋃
u|uv∈E
Hu

 ∪ {Rv} ,
where Rv is the set of remaining elements that do not belong to the first part of the partition.
Informally, Pv,k is a binary partition where on one side we have the two elements jv,k and
j′v,k and all the helper elements corresponding to neighbor nodes of v, and on the other side
we have the rest of the elements.
Let us begin the analysis of the above DSP instance by determining the contribution of each
part in an arbitrary partition P to R(P).
Claim 3.3. Let P be an arbitrary partition. Then, for every part S ∈ P, the contribution of S
to R(P) is 0, unless |S| ≥ 2 and S contains at least one non-helper item. In the last case, the
contribution of S to the total revenue is:
µ(S) · v(S) = 1 .
Proof. There are a few cases to consider.
• If S contains only helper elements, then it is valuable only to ih, and thus, has a 0 contribution
to R(P).
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• If S contains only one element, then it is valuable only to one bidder because each element is
valuable only to one element. Thus, it again contributes 0 to R(P).
• If S contains multiple elements, at least one of which is non-helper, then it is valuable to at
least two bidders. Specifically, for every element jv,k ∈ S, viv,k,S = 2ℓN/|S|. Additionally, if
there are helper elements in S, then:
vih,S =
2ℓN · |S ∩ {j′v,k | v ∈ V, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}|
|S|
≥
2ℓN
|S|
.
Hence, for any such part S we get v(S) = max
(2)
i∈B vi,S = 2ℓN/|S|, and the contribution of the
part to R(P) is µ(S) · v(S) = 1.
Let A be an arbitrary independent set of G, and let SA := {mv,k | v ∈ A, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}. The
following claim lower bounds the revenue of the joint partition arising when the mediators of SA
are the only speaking mediators.
Claim 3.4. R(×mv,k∈SAPv,k) ≥ |SA| = ℓ · |A|.
Proof. Observe that Pv,k separates jv,k from every other item of the set {jv,k | v ∈ V, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ}.
Hence, ×mv,k∈SAPv,k contains |SA| different parts {Tv,k | mv,k ∈ SA}, where each part Tv,k contains
jv,k. On the other hand, each pair (jv,k, j
′
v,k) of items is separated only by the partitions of mediators
corresponding to neighbors of v. Since A is independent, this implies that jv,k and j
′
v,k share part
in ×mv,k∈SAPv,k for every mediator mv,k ∈ SA. In other words, for every mv,k ∈ SA, the part
Tv,k contains j
′
v,k in addition to jv,k, and thus by Claim 3.3, contributes 1 to R(×mv,k∈SAPv,k).
Therefore, R(×mv,k∈SAPv,k) ≥ |SA| = ℓ · |A|, as claimed.
Claim 3.4 asserts that there exists a solution for the above DSP instance whose value is at least
ℓ · OPT , where OPT is the size of the maximum independent set in G.
Consider now an arbitrary set S of mediators, and let S′ = {mv,k ∈ S | ∀mu,k′∈S uv 6∈ E}.
Informally, a mediator mv,k is in S
′ if it belongs to S and no neighbor node u of v has a mediator
in S. The following lemma upper bounds in terms of |S′| the revenue of the joint partition of the
mediators in S.
Lemma 3.5. R(×mv,k∈SPv,k) ≤ |S
′|+N + 1.
Proof. Each partition Pv,k separates a single non-helper element jv,k from the other non-helper
elements. Hence, ×mv,k∈SPv,k consists of at most |S| + 1 parts containing non-helper elements
(recall that parts with only helper elements have 0 contribution to R(×mv,k∈SPv,k), and thus, can
be ignored). Let us label these parts {Tv,k}mv,k∈S , T , where Tv,k is the part containing jv,k for every
mv,k ∈ S and T is the part containing the remaining non-helper elements. Let us upper bound the
contribution of each such part to R(×u∈SPu).
• The part T and all the parts {Tv,k}mv,k∈S′ can contribute at most 1 each because no part has
a larger contribution.
• Consider a part Tv,k obeying mv,k ∈ S \ S
′ and |Jv ∩ S| = 1 (i.e., mv,k is the only mediator
of v belonging to S). This part also contribute at most 1, but there can be at most N such
parts, one for every node.
• Finally, consider a part Tv,k obeying mv,k ∈ S\S
′ and |Jv∩S| ≥ 2 (i.e., at least two mediators
of v belong to S). By the construction of Pv,k, Tv,k can contain in addition to jv,k only the
corresponding helper element j′v,k and helper elements from
⋃
u|uv∈E Hu. Let us see why none
of these helper elements actually belongs to Tv,k, and thus, the part Tv contains only jv,k and
contributes 0.
– Since mv,k 6∈ S
′, there exists a neighbor node v′ of v having a mediator mv′,k′ ∈ S. Then,
the partition Pv′,k′ separates j
′
v,k from jv,k and guarantees that j
′
v,k 6∈ Tv,k.
– Let mv,k′ be another mediator in Jv ∩ S (exists since |Jv ∩ S| ≥ 2). Then, the partition
Pv,k′ separates the helper elements of
⋃
u|uv∈E Hu from jv,k and guarantees that none of
these helper mediators belongs to Tv,k.
In conclusion: R(×mv,k∈SPv,k) ≤ |S
′|+N + 1, as claimed.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2.
Algorithm 1: Independent Set Algorithm
1 Construct a DSP instance from the independent set instance as described above.
2 Run the α-approximation algorithm for DSP assumed by Theorem 3.2 on the constructed
instance, and let S be the set of mediators speaking in the obtained strategy profile.
3 Calculate the configuration S′ = {mv,k ∈ S | ∀mu,k′∈S uv 6∈ E}.
4 Calculate the independent set A′ = {v ∈ V | ∃1≤k≤ℓmv,k ∈ S
′}.
5 If A′ is non-empty output it, otherwise output an arbitrary single node.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Consider Algorithm 1. We would like to show that this algorithm is an α(1+
ℓ−1(N + 1))-approximation algorithm for Maximum Independent Set, which proves the theorem.
The DSP instance constructed by Algorithm 1 has a strategy profile of revenue at least ℓ ·OPT by
Claim 3.4. Since S is obtained using an α-approximation algorithm, R(×mv,k∈SPv,k) ≥ ℓ ·OPT/α.
By Lemma 3.5 we now get:
|S′| ≥ R(×mv,k∈SPv,k)− (N + 1) ≥ ℓ · OPT/α− (N + 1) .
Informally, A′ is the set of nodes having mediators in S′. The independence of A′ follows from
the construction of S′, which guarantees that Algorithm 1 outputs an independent set. Additionally,
since each node has ℓ mediators:
|A′| ≥
|S′|
ℓ
≥
ℓ ·OPT/α− (N + 1)
ℓ
=
OPT
α
−
N + 1
ℓ
.
If OPT ≥ α(1 + ℓ−1(N + 1)), then:
|A′| ≥
OPT
α
−
N + 1
ℓ
=
OPT
α(1 + ℓ−1(N + 1))
+
[1− (1 + ℓ−1(N + 1))−1] ·OPT
α
−
N + 1
ℓ
≥
OPT
α(1 + ℓ−1(N + 1))
.
On the other hand, if OPT ≤ α(1+ ℓ−1(N +1)), then the solution of Algorithm 1 is of size at least
OPT
α(1+ℓ−1(N+1))
simply because it is not empty.
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3.2 Approximation algorithms for DSP
In light of Theorem 3.2, an efficient algorithm with a reasonable approximation guarantee for general
DSP is unlikely to exist when the three parameters of the problem are all “large”. Subsection 3.2.1
gives a trivial algorithm which has a good approximation guarantee when either n or k is small. A
more interesting result is given in Subsection 3.2.2, which proves a 5-approximation algorithm for
DSPunder the assumption that the mediators are local experts (as stated in Theorem 1.3).
3.2.1 A simple max{1,min{n, k − 1}}-approximation algorithm for DSP
In this section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2. There is an efficient max{1,min{n, k − 1}}-approximation algorithm for DSP.
Proof. We show that the algorithm that simply returns the partition {I}, the joint partition cor-
responding to the case where all mediators are silent, has the promised approximation guarantee.
For that purpose we analyze the revenue of {I} in two different ways:
• Let P ′ = (P ′1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m) be an arbitrary strategy profile of the instance in question. The
revenue of P ′ is:
R(×mt=1P
′
t) =
∑
S∈×mt=1P
′
t
µ(S) · v(S) ≤ | ×mt=1 P
′
t| · max
S∈×mt=1P
′
t
µ(S) · v(S)
≤ n · max
S∈×mt=1P
′
t
µ(S) · v(S) ≤ n ·R({I}) ,
where the last inequality holds since, for every set S, R({I}) = v(I) ≥ v(S) ·µ(S). This shows
that the approximation ratio of the trivial strategy profile {I} provides an n-approximation
to the optimal revenue.
• If k = 1, then the revenue of any strategy profile is 0 since we assume a second price auction.
Hence, we can assume from now on k > 1.Let P ′ = (P ′1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m) be an arbitrary strategy
profile of the instance in question. The revenue of P ′ is:
R(×mt=1P
′
t) =
∑
S∈×mt=1P
′
t
µ(S) · v(S) =
∑
S∈×mt=1P
′
t
µ(S) ·
(
max
(2)
i∈B
∑
j∈S µ(j) · vi,j
µ(S)
)
=
∑
S∈×mt=1P
′
t

max(2)i∈B∑
j∈S
µ(j) · vi,j

 .
For every bidder i ∈ B, let Σi =
∑
j∈I µ(j) · vij . It is easy to see that v(I) = max
(2)
i∈B Σi (in
other words, the second highest Σi value is v(I)). Let i
∗ ∈ B be the index maximizing Σi∗
(breaking ties arbitrary). Consider a set S ∈ ×mt=1P
′
t. The elements of S contribute at least
max
(2)
i∈B
∑
j∈S µ(j) · vi,j to at least two of the values: Σ1, . . . ,Σn. Thus, they contribute at
least the same quantity to the sum
∑
i∈B\{i∗} Σi. This means that at least one of the values
{Σi}i∈B\{i∗} must be at least:∑
S∈×mt=1P
′
t
(
max
(2)
i∈B
∑
j∈S µ(j) · vi,j
)
k − 1
=
R(×mt=1P
′
t)
k − 1
.
By definition Σi∗ must also be at least that large, and therefore,
R({I}) = v(I) ≥ R(×mt=1P
′
t)/(k − 1).
3.2.2 A 5-approximation algorithm for Local Expert mediators
In this subsection we consider an interesting special case of DSP which is henceforth shown to
admit a constant factor approximation.
Definition 3.6 (Local Expert mediators). A mediator t in a DSP instance is a local experts if
there exists a set It ⊆ I such that: Pt = {{j} | j ∈ It} ∪ {I \ It}.
Informally, a local expert mediator has perfect knowledge about a single set It—if the item
belongs to It, he can tell exactly which item it is. Our objective in the rest of the section is to
prove Theorem 1.3, i.e., to describe a 5-approximation algorithm for instances of DSP consisting
of only local expert mediators.
We begin the proof with an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal joint strategy, which we
denote by P∗. To describe this bound, we need some notation. We use Iˆ to denote the set of items
that are within the experty field of some mediator (formally, Iˆ =
⋃
t∈M It). Additionally, for every
item j ∈ I, hj and sj denote µ(j) times the largest value and second largest value, respectively, of
j for any bidder (more formally, hj = µ(j) ·maxi∈B vi,j and sj = µ(j) ·max
(2)
i∈B vi,j).
Next, we need to partition the items into multiple sets. The optimal joint partition P∗ is
obtained from partitions {P∗t }t∈M , where P
∗
t is a possible partition for mediator t. Each part of
P∗ is the intersection of |M | parts, one from each partition in {P∗t }t∈M . On the other hand, each
part of P∗t is a subset of It, except for maybe a single part. Hence, there exists at most a single
part I0 ∈ P
∗ such that I0 6⊆ It for any t ∈M . For ease of notation, if there is no such part (which
can happen when Iˆ = I) we denote I0 = ∅. To partition the items of I \ I0, we associate each part
S ∈ P∗ \ {I0} with an arbitrary mediator t such that S ⊆ It, and denote by At the set of items
of all the parts associated with mediator t. Observe that the construction of At guarantees that
At ⊆ It. Additionally, {I0} ∪ {At}t∈M is a disjoint partition of I.
A different partition of the items partitions them according to the bidder that values them the
most. In other words, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Hi is the set of items for which bidder i has the largest
value. If multiple bidders have the same largest value for an item, we assign it to the set Hi of an
arbitrary one of these bidders. Notice that the construction of Hi guarantees that the sets {Hi}i∈B
are disjoint.
Finally, for every set S ⊆ I, we use φ(S) to denote the sum of the |B| − 1 smaller values in
{
∑
j∈Hi∩S
hj}i∈B , i.e., the sum of all the values except the largest one. In other words, we calculate
for every bidder i the sum of its values for items in Hi ∩ S, and then add up the |B| − 1 smaller
sums. Using all the above notation we can now state our promised upper bound on R(P∗).
Lemma 3.7. R(P∗) ≤ µ(I0) · v(I0) +
∑
j∈Iˆ sj +
∑
t∈M φ(At).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary mediator t ∈ M , and let i be the bidder whose term is not counted by
φ(At). For every part S ∈ P
∗ associated with t, let i′ be a bidder other than i that has one of the
two largest bids for S. By definition:
µ(S) · v(S) = max
(2)
i′′∈B
∑
j∈S
µ(j) · vi′′,j ≤
∑
j∈S
µ(j) · vi′,j ≤
∑
j∈S∩Hi
sj +
∑
j∈S\Hi
hj .
Summing over all parts associated with t, we get:∑
S∈P∗
S⊆At
µ(S) · v(S) ≤
∑
j∈At∩Hi
sj +
∑
j∈At\Hi
hj ≤
∑
j∈At
sj + φ(At) .
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Summing over all mediators, we get:
R(P∗)− µ(I0) · v(I0) ≤
∑
t∈M

∑
j∈At
sj + φ(At)

 ≤∑
j∈Iˆ
sj +
∑
t∈M
φ(At) .
Our next step is to describe joint partitions that can be found efficiently and upper bound the
different terms in the bound given by Lemma 3.7 (up to a constant factor). Finding such partitions
for the first two terms is quite straightforward.
Observation 3.8. The joint partitions where all mediators are silent {I} = ×i∈B{I} obeys:
R({I}) ≥ µ(I0) · v(I0) .
Proof.
R({I}) = max
(2)
i∈B

∑
j∈I
µ(j) · vi,j

 ≥ max(2)i∈B

∑
j∈I0
µ(j) · vi,j

 = µ(I0) · v(I0) .
Observation 3.9. The joint partitions PS = ×t∈MPt where every mediators reports all his infor-
mation obeys:
R(PS) = R({{j}j∈Iˆ} ∪ {I \ Iˆ}) ≥
∑
j∈Iˆ
µ(j) ·max
(2)
i∈B vi,j =
∑
j∈Iˆ
sj .
It remains to find a joint partition that upper bounds, up to a constant factor, the third term
in the bound given by Lemma 3.7. If one knows the sets {At}t∈M , then one can easily get such a
partition using the method of Ghosh et al. [GNS07]. In this method, one partitions every set At
into the parts {At ∩Hi}
t
i=1 and sort these parts according to the value of
∑
j∈At∩Hi
hj . Then, with
probability 1/2 every even part is united with the part that appears after it in the above order,
and with probability 1/2 it is united with the part that appears before it in this order. It is not
difficult to verify that if the part of bidder i is not the first in the order, then with probability 1/2
it is unified with the part that appears before it in the order, and then it contributes
∑
j∈At∩Hi
hj
to the revenue. Hence, the expected contribution to the revenue of the parts produced from At is
at least 1/2 · φ(At).
Algorithm 2 can find a partition that is competitive against
∑
t∈M φ(At) without knowing the
sets {At}t∈M . The algorithm uses the notation of a cover. We say that a set Sj is a cover of an
element j ∈ It ∩Hi if Sj ⊆ It ∩Hi′ for some i 6= i
′.
Algorithm 2: Local Experts - Auxiliary Algorithm
1 Let I ′ ← Iˆ and P ← {I \ Iˆ}.
2 while I ′ 6= ∅ do
3 Let j be the element maximizing hj in I
′.
4 Find a cover Sj ⊆ I
′ of j obeying hj ≤
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ ≤ 2hj , or maximizing
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ if no
cover of j makes this expression at least hj .
5 Add the part Sj ∪ {j} to P, and remove the elements of Sj ∪ {j} from I
′.
6 return P
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Notice that the definition of cover guarantees that a part containing both j and Sj contributes
to the revenue at least min{hj ,
∑
j′∈Sjhj′
}. Using this observation, each iteration of Algorithm 2
can be viewed as trying to extract revenue from element j. Additionally, observe that the partition
P produced by Algorithm 2 can be presented as a joint partition since every part in it, except for
I \ Iˆ, contains only items that belong to a single set It (for some mediator t ∈M).
Observation 3.10. Algorithm 2 can be implemented in polynomial time.
Proof. One can find a cover Sj maximizing
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ in line 4 of the algorithm by considering the
set It ∩Hi′ ∩ I
′ for every mediators t and bidder i′ obeying j ∈ It and j 6∈ Hi′ . Moreover, if this
cover is of size larger than 2hj , then by removing elements from this cover one by one the algorithm
must find a cover S′j obeying hj ≤
∑
j′∈S′j
hj′ ≤ 2hj because j is the element maximizing hj in
I ′.
The following lemma relates the revenue of the set produced by Algorithm 2 to
∑
t∈M φ(At).
Lemma 3.11. No iteration of the loop of Algorithm 2 decreases the expression R(P) + 1/3 ·∑
t∈M φ(At ∩ I
′).7
Proof. Fix an arbitrary iteration. There are two cases to consider. First, assume hj ≤
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ ≤
2hj . In this case the increase in R(P) during this iteration is:
µ(Sj ∪ {j}) · v(Sj ∪ {j}) ≥ min

hj , ∑
j′∈Sj
hj′

 = hj .
On the other hand, one can observe that, when removing an element j′ from S, the value of φ(S)
can decrease by at most hj′ . Hence, the decrease in
∑
t∈M φ(At ∩ I
′) during this iteration can be
upper bounded by:
hj +
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ ≤ 3hj .
Consider now the case
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ < hj . In this case the increase in R(P) during the iteration
is:
µ(Sj ∪ {j}) · v(Sj ∪ {j}) ≥ min

hj , ∑
j′∈Sj
hj′

 = ∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ .
If j does not belong to At for any mediator t, then by the above argument we can bound the decrease
in
∑
t∈M φ(At ∩ I
′) by
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ . Hence, assume from now on that there exists a mediator t
′ and
a bidder i such that j ∈ At′ ∩Hi. Let i
′ 6= i be a bidder maximizing
∑
j′∈Hi′∩At′∩I
′ hj′ . Clearly,
the removal of a single element from I ′ can decrease φ(At′ ∩ I
′) by no more than
∑
j′∈Hi′∩At′∩I
′ hj′ .
Hence, the decrease in
∑
t∈M φ(At∩I
′) during the iteration of the algorithm can be upper bounded
by: ∑
j′∈Hi′∩At′∩I
′
hj′ +
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ .
On the other hand, Hi′ ∩At′ ∩ I
′ is a possible cover for j, and thus, by the optimality of Sj:∑
j′∈Hi′∩At′∩I
′
hj′ ≤
∑
j′∈Sj
hj′ .
7Before the algorithm terminates P is a partial partition in the sense that some items do not belong to any part
in it. However, the definition of R(P) naturally extends to such partial partitions.
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Corollary 3.12. R(PA) ≥ 1/3 ·
∑
t∈M φ(At), where PA is the partition produced by Algorithm 2.
Proof. After the initialization step of Algorithm 2 we have:
R(P) + 1/3 ·
∑
t∈M
φ(At ∩ I
′) ≥ 1/3 ·
∑
t∈M
φ(At) .
On the other hand, when the algorithm terminates:
R(P) + 1/3 ·
∑
t∈M
φ(At ∩ I
′) = R(PA)
because I ′ = ∅. The corollary now follows from Lemma 3.11.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.3.
Theorem 1.3. If mediators are local experts, there exists an efficient 5-approximation algorithm
for DSP.
Proof. Consider an algorithm that outputs the best solution out of {I}, PS and PA. The following
inequality shows that at least one of these joint partitions has a revenue of R(P∗)/5:
R({I}) +R(PS) + 3R(PA) ≥
∑
j∈Iˆ
sj + µ(I0) · v(I0) +
∑
t∈M
φ(At) ≥ R(P
∗) ,
where the first inequality holds by Observations 3.8 and 3.9 and Corollary 3.12; and the second
inequality uses the upper bound on R(P∗) proved by Lemma 3.7.
4 The Strategic Problem
This section explores the DSP problem from a strategic viewpoint, in which the auctioneer cannot
control the signals produced by each mediator, and is, therefore, trying to solicit information from
the mediators that would yield a maximal revenue in the auction. In other words, the objective of
the auctioneer is to design a mechanism M whose equilibria (i.e., the signals P ′1,P
′
2, . . . ,P
′
m which
are now chosen strategically by the mediators) induce maximum revenue. Our first contribution
is the introduction of the Shapley mechanism, whose definition appears in Subsection 4.1. Subsec-
tion 4.1 also proves some interesting properties of the Shapley mechanism (Theorems 1.4 and 1.5).
Subsection 4.2 studies the price of anarchy and price of stability of the DSP game induced by
the Shapley mechanism (Theorems 1.6 and 1.7). Finally, Subsection 4.3 shows that the Shapley
mechanism is the only possible mechanism if one insists on a few natural requirements.
4.1 The Shapley Mechanism
In this subsection we describe a mechanism S which determines the payments to the mediators as
a function of the reported signals. Our mechanism aims to incentivize mediators to report useful
information, with the hope that global efficiency emerges despite selfish behavior of each mediator.
In the remainder of the paper we study the mechanism S and the game DSPS it induces. For the
sake of generality, we describe S for a game generalizing DSP.
Consider a game Gm of m players where each player t has a finite set At of possible strategies,
one of which ∅t ∈ At is called the null strategy of t. The value of a strategy profile in the game Gm
is determined by a value function v : A1×A2× . . .×Am → R. A mechanism M = (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πm)
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for Gm is a set of payments rules. In other words, if the players choose strategies a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈
A2, . . . , am ∈ Am, then the payment to player t under mechanism M is Πt(v, a1, a2, . . . , am). Notice
that DSP fits the definition of Gm when At = Ω(Pt) is the set of partitions that t can report for
every mediator t, and ∅t is the silence strategy {I}. The appropriate value function v for DSP
is the function R(×mt=1P
′
t), where P
′
t ∈ At is the strategy of mediator t. In other words, the value
function v of a DSP game is equal to the revenue of the auctioneer.
Given a strategy profile a = (a1, a2, . . . , am), and subset J ∈ [m] of players, we write aJ to
denote a strategy profiles where the players of J play their strategy in a, and the other players
play their null strategies. We abuse notation and denote by ∅ the strategy profile a∅ where all
players play their null strategies. Additionally, we write (a′t, a−t) to denote a strategy profile where
player t plays a′t and the rest of the players follow the strategy profile a. The mechanism S we
propose distributes the increase in the value of the game (compared to v(∅)) among the players
according to their Shapley value: it pays each player his expected marginal contribution to the
value according to a uniformly random ordering of the m player. Formally, the payoff for player t
given a strategy profile a is
Πt(a) =
1
m!
·
∑
σ∈Sm
[
v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j≤σ(t)}
)
− v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j<σ(t)}
)]
, (1)
which can alternatively be written as
Πt(a) =
∑
J⊆[m]\{t}
γJ
(
v(aJ∪{t})− v(aJ)
)
, (2)
where γJ =
|J |!(m−|J |−1)!
m! is the probability that the players of J appear before player t when
the players are ordered according to a uniformly random permutation σ ∈R Sm. We use both
definitions (1) and (2) interchangeably, as each one is more convenient in some cases than the
other.
Clearly, the mechanism S is anonymous (symmetric). The main feature of the Shapley mech-
anism is that it is efficient. In other words, the sum of the payoffs is exactly equal to the total
increase in value (in the case of DSP, the surplus revenue of the auctioneer compared to the initial
state):
Proposition 4.1 (Efficiency property). For every strategy profile a = (a1, a2, . . . , am),
v(a)− v(∅) =
m∑
t=1
Πt(a) .
Proof. Recall that the payoff of mediator t is:
1
m!
·
∑
σ∈Sm
[
v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j≤σ(t)}
)
− v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j<σ(t)}
)]
.
Summing over all mediators, we get:
m∑
t=1
Πt(P
′
t,P
′
−t) =
m∑
t=1
{
1
m!
·
∑
σ∈Sm
[
v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j≤σ(t)}
)
− v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j<σ(t)}
)]}
=
1
m!
·
∑
σ∈Sm
m∑
t=1
[
v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j≤σ(t)}
)
− v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j<σ(t)}
)]
=
1
m!
·
∑
σ∈Sm
[
v
(
a{σ−1(j)|1≤j≤m}
)
− v (a∅)
]
= v(a)− v(∅) .
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Proposition 4.1 implies the following theorem. Notice that Theorem 1.5 is in fact a restriction
of this theorem to the game DSPS .
Theorem 4.2. For every Nash equilibrium a, v(a) ≥ v(∅).
Proof. A player always has the option of playing his null strategy, which results in a zero payoff
for him. Thus, the payoff of a player in a Nash equilibrium can never be negative. Hence, by
Proposition 4.1: v(a) ≥ v(∅) +
∑m
i=1Πt(a) ≥ v(∅).
Next, let us prove Theorem 1.4. For convenience, we restate it below.
Theorem 1.4. Let Gm be a non-cooperative m-player game in which the payoff of each player is
set according to S. Then Gm admits a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, best response dynamics
are guaranteed to converge to such an equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that Gm is an exact potential game, which in turn implies
all the conclusions of the theorem. Recall that an exact potential game is a game for which there
exists a potential function Φ: A1×A2×· · ·×At → R such that every strategy profile a and possible
deviation a′t ∈ At of a player t obey:
Πt(a
′
t, a−t)−Πt(a) = Φ(a
′
t, a−t)− Φ(a) . (3)
In our case the potential function is: Φ(a) =
∑
J⊆[m] βJ · v(aJ ), where βJ =
(|J |−1)!(m−|J |)!
m! . Let
us prove that this function obeys (3). It is useful to denote by a′ the strategy profile (a′t, a−t). By
definition:
Πt(a
′)−Πt(a) =
∑
J⊆[m]\{i}
γJ
[
v(aJ∪{i})− v(aJ )
]
−
∑
J⊆[m]\{i}
γJ
[
v(a′J∪{i})− v(a
′
J )
]
. (4)
For J ⊆ [m] \ {i}, we have aJ = a
′
J . Plugging this observation into (4), and rearranging, we get:
Πt(a
′)−Πt(a) =
∑
J⊆[m]\{i}
γJ
[
v(aJ∪{i})− v(a
′
J∪{i})
]
. (5)
For every J containing i we get: αJ\{i} = βJ . Using this observation and the previous observation
that aJ = a
′
J for J ⊆ [m] \ {i}, (5) can be replaced by:
Πt(a
′)−Πt(a) =
∑
J⊆[m]
βJ(v(a
′
J )− v(aJ)) = Φ(a
′)− Φ(a) .
Before concluding this section, a few remarks regarding the use of S to DSP are in order:
1. The reader may wonder why the auctioneer cannot impose on the mediators any desired
outcome ×t∈MP
′
t by offering mediator t a negligible payment if he signals P
′
t, and no payment
otherwise. However, implementing such a mechanism requires the auctioneer to know the
information sets Pt of each mediator in advance. In contrast, our mechanism requires access
only to the outputs of the mediators.
2. Proposition 4.1 implies that the auctioneer distributes the entire surplus among the mediators,
which seems to defeat the purpose of the mechanism. However, in the target application she
can scale the revenue by a factor α ∈ (0, 1] and only distribute the corresponding fraction of
the surplus. As all of our results are invariant under scaling, this trick can be applied in a
black box fashion. Thus, we assume, without loss of generality, α = 1.
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3. We assume mediators never report a signal which is inconsistent with the true identity of
the sold element jR. The main justification for this assumption is that the mediators’ signals
must be consistent with one another (as they refer to a single element jR). Thus, given that
sufficiently many mediators are honest, “cheaters” can be easily detected.
4.2 The Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability of the Shapley Mechanism
In this section we analyze the PoS and PoA of the DSPS game. First, we note that the proof of
Theorem 1.2 in Section 3.2 shows that R({I}) ≥ max{1,min{n, k−1}}. Together with Theorem 1.5,
we get:
Theorem 1.6. The price of anarchy of DSPS(n, k,m) is no more than max{1,min{k − 1, n}}.
Remark: The above statement of Theorem 1.7 uses a somewhat different notation than its original
statement in Section 1.2, but both statements are equivalent. The same is true for the statement
of Theorem 1.7 below.
Naturally, the upper bound given by Theorem 1.6 applies also to the price of stability of DSPS .
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 1.7, which shows that Theorem 1.6 is
asymptotically tight.
Theorem 1.7. For every n ≥ 1, there is a DSPS(3n + 1, n + 2, 2) game for which the price of
stability is at least n. Moreover, all the mediators in this game are local experts.
We begin the proof of Theorem 1.7 by describing the DSPS(3n+1, n+2, 2) game whose price
of stability we bound. For ease of notation, let us denote this game by DSPn.
items: The 3n + 1 items of DSPn all have equal probabilities. It is convenient to denoted them
by {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1, {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1, {cℓ}
n
ℓ=1 and d.
bidders: The n+2 bidders of DSPn can be partitioned into 3 types. One bidder, denoted by iG,
has a bid of ε for the items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 and a bid of 1 for all other items, where ε ∈ (0, 1) is a
value that will be defined later. One bidder, denoted by iO has a bid of 1 for item d and a
bid of 0 for all other items. Finally, the other n bidders are denoted by {iℓ}
n
ℓ=1. Each bidder
iℓ has a bid of 1 for item bℓ and a bid of 0 for all other items.
mediators: The two mediators ofDSPn are denoted by t1 and t2. Both mediators are local experts
whose partitions are defined by the sets I1 = {aℓ, bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 and I2 = {bℓ, cℓ}
n
ℓ=1, respectively.
A graphical sketch of DSPn is given by Figure 1. Intuitively, getting a high revenue in DSPn
requires pairing b items with a or c items. Unfortunately, one mediator can pair the b items with
a items, and the other mediator can pair them with c items, thus, creating “tension” between the
mediators. The main idea of the proof is to show that both mediators are incentivized to report
partitions pairing the b items, which results in a joint partition isolating all the b items.
The following observation simplifies many of our proofs.
Observation 4.3. The contribution µ(S) · v(S) of a part S to the revenue R(P) of a partition
P ∋ S is:
• (3n + 1)−1 if S contains d.
• (3n + 1)−1 if S contains an item of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 and |S| ≥ 2.
• ε/(3n + 1) if S contains only a single item, and this item belongs to {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1.
• 0 otherwise.
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V =


a items︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 1 . . . 1
b items︷ ︸︸ ︷
ε ε . . . ε
c items︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 1 . . . 1
d︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 1
0 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 1 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
... 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0 0


← iG
← iO
← i1
← i2
...
← in
P1 =  · · ·   · · · 
P2 =  · · ·   · · · 
Figure 1: A graphical representation of DSPn. P1 and P2 are the partitions of mediators t1 and t2,
respectively.
Proof. Notice that the only bidder that values more than one item is iG, and thus, iG is the single
bidder that can have a bid larger than 1/|S| for S. Hence, v(S) is upper bounded by 1/|S|, and
one can bound the contribution of S by:
µ(S) · v(S) ≤
|S|
3n+ 1
·
1
|S|
= (3n + 1)−1 .
If the part S contains the item d, then both bidders iG and iO have bids of at least 1/|S| for it.
Hence, the above upper bound on the contribution of S is in fact tight. Similarly when S contains
an item bℓ and some other item j, it has a contribution of (3n+ 1)
−1 since two bidders have a bid
of at least 1/|S| for it, bidder iℓ and a second bidder that depends on j:
• If j = bℓ′ for some ℓ
′ 6= ℓ, bidder iℓ′ .
• If j = d, j = aℓ′ or j = cℓ′ , bidder iG.
If the part S contains only a single item bℓ, then it gets none zero bids only from two bidders:
a bid of 1 from iℓ and a bid of ε from bidder iG. Hence, µ(S) · v(S) = (3n + 1)
−1 · ε. Finally, if S
does not fall into any of the cases considered above, then it must contain only items of {aℓ, cℓ}
n
ℓ=1.
Such a part receives a non-zero bid only from bidder iG, and thus, v(S) = 0.
The next lemma gives a lower bound on the optimal revenue of DSPn.
Lemma 4.4. The optimal revenue of DSPn is at least (n+ 1)/(3n + 1).
Proof. Consider a scenario in which t1 pairs the b items with a items, and t2 is silent. Formally,
the two mediators use the following strategies O1 = {{aℓ, bℓ}}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {{cℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d}} and O2 = {I},
respectively. Observe that these are indeed feasible strategies for t1 and t2, respectively. By
Observation 4.3, the revenue of DSPn given these strategies is:
R(O1 ×O2) = R(O1) =
n∑
ℓ=1
µ({aℓ, bℓ}) · v({aℓ, bℓ}) + µ({cℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d}) · v({cℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d})
=
n∑
ℓ=1
1
3n+ 1
+
1
3n+ 1
=
n+ 1
3n+ 1
.
Our next objective is to get an upper bound on the revenue of any Nash equilibrium of DSPn.
We say that an item aℓ is redundant in a strategy P
′
1 of t1 if the part S ∈ P
′
1 containing aℓ obeys
one of the following:
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• S contains the item d or an item aℓ′ for some ℓ
′ 6= ℓ..
• S contains no items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1.
The next lemma shows that a redundant item is indeed redundant in the sense that removing it
does not change the contribution to the revenue of parts containing it.
Lemma 4.5. If aℓ is redundant in a strategy P
′
1 of t1 and S ∈ P
′
1 is the part containing aℓ, then
µ(S) ·v(S) = µ(S \{aℓ}) ·v(S \{aℓ}). Moreover, for every possible strategy P
′
2 of t2, if S
′ ∈ P ′1×P
′
2
is the part of P ′1 × P
′
2 containing aℓ, then µ(S
′) · v(S′) = µ(S′ \ {aℓ}) · v(S
′ \ {aℓ})
Proof. We prove the second part of the lemma. The first part follows from it since one possible
choice of P ′2 is {I}. Since aℓ is redundant in P1, one of the following three cases must hold:
• The first case is when d ∈ S. Observe that d must share a part with aℓ in P
′
2, and thus, d
belongs also to S′. Hence, by Observation 4.3, µ(S′) ·v(S′) = (3n+1)−1 = µ(S′ \{aℓ}) ·v(S
′ \
{aℓ}).
• The second case is when ({bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d}) ∩ S = ∅. Since S
′ is a subset of S, we get also
({bℓ}
n
ℓ=1∪{d})∩S
′ = ∅, and thus, by Observation 4.3, µ(S′) ·v(S′) = 0 = µ(S′ \{aℓ}) ·v(S
′ \
{aℓ}).
• The third case is when there exits ℓ′ 6= ℓ for which aℓ′ ∈ S. Since aℓ and aℓ′ must share a
part in P2, they both belong also to S
′. Using Observation 4.3 one can verify that removing
aℓ from a set S
′ containing aℓ′ can never change µ(S
′) · v(S′).
A strategy P ′1 of t1 is called a-helped if every part in it that contains an item of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 contains
also an item of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1. The next lemma shows that every strategy of t1 is dominated by an
a-helped one.
Lemma 4.6. If P ′1 is a strategy of t1, then there exists an a-helped strategy P
′′
1 of t1 such that:
Π1(P
′′
1 ,P
′
2) ≥ Π1(P
′
1,P
′
2) for every strategy P
′
2 of t2. Moreover, for every pair of items from
{bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d}, P
′′
1 separates this pair (i.e., each item of the pair appear in a different part of P
′′
1 ) if
and only if P ′1 does.
Proof. Let D(P ′1) be the number of parts in P
′
1 that contain an item of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 but no items of
{aℓ}
n
ℓ=1. We prove the lemma by induction on D(P
′
1). If D(P
′
1) = 0, then P
′
1 is a-helped and we
are done. It remains to prove the lemma for D(P ′1) > 0 assuming that it holds for every strategy
Pˆ ′1 for which D(P
′
1) > D(Pˆ
′
1).
Since D(P ′1) > 0 and the number of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1 items and {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 items is equal, there must be
in P ′1 either a part that contains at least two items of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1 or a part that contains an item of
{aℓ}
n
ℓ=1 and no items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1. Both options imply the existence of a redundant item aℓ′ in P
′
1.
Additionally, let S be one of the parts of P ′1 counted by D(P
′
1), i.e., a part that contains an item
of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 but no items of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1.
Consider the strategy P˜ ′1 obtained from P
′
1 by moving aℓ′ to the part S. By Lemma 4.5 the
contribution to the revenue of the part containing aℓ′ in P
′
1 does not decrease following the removal
of aℓ′ from it. On the other hand, Observation 4.3 implies that adding items to a part can only
increase its contribution. Hence, the contribution of S to the revenue is at least as large in P˜ ′1
as in P ′1. Combining both arguments, we get: R(P˜
′
1) ≥ R(P
′
1). An analogous argument can be
used to show also that R(P˜ ′1 × P
′
2) ≥ R(P
′
1 × P
′
2) for every strategy P
′
2 of t2. Thus, by definition,
Π1(P˜
′
1,P
′
2) ≥ Π1(P
′
1,P
′
2).
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Observe that the construction of P˜ ′1 from P
′
1 guarantees that D(P˜
′
1) = D(P
′
1) − 1. Hence, by
applying the induction hypothesis to P˜ ′1 we get a strategy P
′′
1 which, for every strategy P
′
2 of t2,
obeys the inequality:
Π1(P
′′
1 ,P
′
2) ≥ Π1(P˜
′
1,P
′
2) ≥ Π1(P
′
1,P
′
2)
Moreover, the construction of P˜ ′1 from P
′
1 does not move any items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d}, thus, P˜
′
1
separates pairs from this set if and only if P ′1 does. The lemma now follows since the induction
hypothesis guarantees that P ′′1 separates pairs from the above set if and only if P˜
′
1 does.
Using the previous lemma we can prove an important property of not strictly dominated strate-
gies of t1.
Lemma 4.7. If P ′1 is not a strictly dominated strategy of t1, then P
′
1 isolates the items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1∪
{d} from each other.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that the lemma does not hold, and let P ′1 be a counter
example. In other words, P ′1 does not isolate the items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d} from each other, and yet
there exists a strategy P ′2 of t2 such that every strategy Pˆ
′
1 of t1 obeys Π1(Pˆ
′
1,P
′
2) ≤ Π1(P
′
1,P
′
2).
By Lemma 4.6 we may assume that P ′1 is an a-helped strategy (otherwise, we can replace P
′
1 with
the strategy whose existence is guaranteed by this lemma).
Let bℓ′ be an item that is not isolated by P
′
1 from some other item of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1∪{d}. The existence
of bℓ′ implies the existence of a redundant item aℓ′′ in P
′
1 because one of the following must be true:
• bℓ′ shares a part in P
′
1 with another item of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1. Since the number of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1 items is
equal to the number of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 items, there must be either a part of P
′
1 that contains an item
of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1 but no items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 or a part of P
′
1 that contains two items of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1.
• bℓ′ shares a part in P
′
1 with the item d. Since P
′
1 is a-helped, this part must contain also an
item of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1 (which is redundant).
Consider the strategy P˜ ′1 obtained from P
′
1 by removing the items aℓ′′ and bℓ′ from their original
parts and placing them together in a new part. Let us analyze R(P˜ ′1) + R(P˜
′
1 × P
′
2). Since aℓ′′ is
redundant, its removal from its original part P˜ ′1 does not decrease the contribution of this part to
either revenue by Lemma 4.5. Additionally, the removal of aℓ′′ leaves bℓ′ either sharing a part in
P ′1 with d or with another item of {aℓ}
n
ℓ=1 and another item of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1. In both cases, the removal
of bℓ′ does not affect the contribution of its part to R(P˜
′
1) by Observation 4.3. On the other hand,
the removal of bℓ′ can decrease the contribution of its part to the revenue R(P˜
′
1 × P
′
2). However,
Observation 4.3 guarantees that this decrease is at most (3n + 1)−1. Finally, the contribution of
the new part {aℓ′′ , bℓ′} to R(P˜
′
1) is (3n + 1)
−1. Combining all these observations, we get:
R(P˜ ′1) +R(P˜
′
1 ×P
′
2) ≥ R(P
′
1) +R(P
′
1 × P2)− (3n + 1)
−1 + (3n+ 1)−1 +A (6)
= R(P ′1) +R(P
′
1 × P2) +A ,
where A is the contribution of parts of P˜ ′1×P
′
2 that are subsets of {aℓ′′ , bℓ′} to R(P˜
′
1×P
′
2). To get
a contradiction it is enough to show that A > 0, i.e., that at least one of these parts has a positive
contribution to R(P˜ ′1 × P
′
2). There are two cases to consider:
• If bℓ′ shares a part with aℓ′′ in P
′
2, then the part {aℓ′′ , bℓ′} appears in P˜
′
1×P
′
2 and contributes
(3n + 1)−1 to R(P˜ ′1 × P2).
• If P ′2 separates the item bℓ′ from aℓ′′ , then the part {bℓ′} appears in P˜
′
1 ×P
′
2 and contributes
ε/(3n + 1) to R(P˜ ′1 × P2).
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Corollary 4.8. If P ′1 and P
′
2 are strategies for t1 and t2 that form a Nash equilibrium, then both
P ′1 and P
′
2 isolate the items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d} from each other.
Proof. Since P ′1 is a part of a Nash equilibrium, it is not strictly dominated. Hence, by Lemma 4.7,
it must isolate the items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d} from each other. The corollary holds also for P
′
2 by
symmetry.
We are now ready to analyze the price of stability of DSPn.
Theorem 4.9. The price of stability of DSPn is at least (n + 1)/(nε + 1). Hence, for ε = 1/n
2,
the price of stability of DSPn is at least n.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium (P ′1,P
′
2) of DSPn. By Corollary 4.8, both P
′
1 and
P ′2 must isolate the items of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 ∪ {d} from each other. However, every other item of I must
share a part with d in at least one of these partitions, and thus, every item of {bℓ}
n
ℓ=1 has a singleton
part in P ′1 × P
′
2. Hence,
R(P ′1 × P
′
2) =
nε+ 1
3n + 1
.
Combining the last observation with Lemma 4.4, we get that the price of stability of DSPn is at
least:
(n+ 1)/(3n + 1)
(nε+ 1)/(3n + 1)
=
n+ 1
nε+ 1
.
Note that Theorem 1.7 follows immediately from Theorem 4.9.
4.3 The weaknesses of S are inevitable
Theorem 1.7 asserts that the revenue of the best equilibrium can be about n times worse than
the optimal revenue. This discouraging result raises the question of whether alternative payment
rules can improve the revenue guarantees of the auctioneer. Unfortunately, Shapley’s uniqueness
theorem answers this question negatively, assuming one requires the mechanism to have some
natural properties.
We consider a family of games of the type considered in Subsection 4.1. Formally, let Fm denote
a family of m-player games where each player t has the same finite set At of possible strategies in
all the games, one of which ∅t ∈ At is called the null strategy of t. Each game in the family is
determined by an arbitrary value function v : A1 × A2 × . . . × Am → R, and each possible such
value function induces a game in Fm. Recall that a mechanism M = (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πm) is a set of
payments rules. In other words, if the players choose strategies a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2, . . . , am ∈ Am,
then the payment of player t under mechanism M is Πt(v, a1, a2, . . . , am).
8
Theorem 4.10 (Uniqueness of Shapley Mechanism, cf. [Sha53]). Let Fm be a family of games
as described above. Then, the Shapley value mechanism S is the only mechanism satisfying the
following axioms:
1. (Normalization) For every player t, Πt(a) = 0 whenever at = ∅t.
8Shapley’s theorem is stated for cooperative games where players in the coalition can reallocate their payments
within the coalition. In our non-cooperative setup, we assume side payments can be only introduced by the mechanism.
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2. (Anonymity) If Gm ∈ Fm is a game with a strategy profile a
∗ such that v(a) = v(∅) (recall
that ∅ denotes the strategy profile (∅1,∅2, . . . ,∅m)) for every strategy profile a 6= a
∗, then
for every strategy profile a and player t:
Πt(a) =
{
0 if at = ∅t ,
v(a)−v(∅)
|{t∈[m]|at 6=∅t}|
otherwise .
3. (Additivity) If Gm,Hm ∈ Fm are two games with value functions vg and vh, then Π
vg+vh
t (a) =
Π
vg
t (a) + Π
vh
t (a) (where Π
v
t (a) stands for the payment of player t given strategy profile a in
the game defined by the value function v).
We note that the second axiom (“Anonymity”) is ubiquitous in market design, and is typically
enforced by market regulations prohibiting discrimination among clients. Intuitively, this axiom
says that whenever there is only one strategy profile a∗ which produces a value other than v(∅),
then, when a∗ is played, the mechanism is required to equally distribute the surplus v(a∗) − v(∅)
among the participants playing a non-null strategy in a∗. Observe that violating this axiom would
require private contracts with (at least some of) the players (mediators). Implementing such con-
tracts defeats one of the main purposes of our mechanism, namely that it can be easily implemented
in a dynamic environment having an unstable mediators population.
The above theorem was originally proved in a cooperative setting (where players may either join a
coalition or not), under slightly different axioms. The “anonymity” axiom of Theorem 4.10 replaces
the fairness and efficiency axioms of the original theorem, and is sufficient for the uniqueness proof
to go through in a non-cooperative setup such as the DSP game.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have considered computational and strategic aspects of auctions involving third
party information mediators. Our main result for the computational point of view shows that it
is NP-hard to get a reasonable approximation ratio when the three parameters of the problem are
all “large”. For the parameters n and k this is tight in the sense that there exists an algorithm
whose approximation ratio is good when either one of these parameters is “small”. However, we
do not know whether a small value for the parameter m allows for a good approximation ratio.
More specifically, even understanding the approximation ratio achievable in the case m = 2 is
an interesting open problem. Observe that the case m = 2 already captures (asymptotically) the
largest possible price of stability and price of anarchy in the strategic setup, and thus, it is tempting
to assume that this case also captures all the complexity of the computational setup.
Unfortunately, most of our results, for both the computational and strategic setups, are quite
negative. The class of local experts we describe is a natural mediators class allowing us to bypass
one of these negative result and get a constant approximation ratio algorithm for the computational
setup. An intriguing potential avenue for future research is finding additional natural classes of
mediators that allow for improved results, either under the computational or the strategic setup.
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